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Is
Charles Bennie Setting Charges for Explosion?
By
Tarty Teh
July
10, 2004
Here is a confusing, but not necessarily troubling, quotation regarding
the claims made by Mr. Charles Bennie (at least as reported in the June
22, 2004, edition of the Inquirer newspaper) suggesting corruption in the
Gyude Bryant interim government:
"The Finance Ministry's release yesterday said it finds it difficult
to comprehend that a transitional government emerging from the throes of
14 years of civil conflict with current five month cash budget of US$23.5m
cannot finance rehabilitation of capital intensive projects like
hydro-electricity and pipe-borne water and at the same time service
current salaries for public service employees." - The Inquirer, June
22, 2004
At face value, the paraphrasing of the Finance Ministry's release suggests
some corroboration of Mr. Charles Bennie's intimation as repeated by a
reporter named Josephus Moses Gray on The Perspective Website (July 3,
2004) that "Commissioner Bennie told journalists in Monrovia that the
Bryant government is generating [US]$7m monthly and that he would[sic] not
understand why government has not restored some of the basic social
services including safe drinking water, electricity, improved
transportation, health and educational systems."
Though, professionally, it appears to have been the amateurs' night at
both the press and the ministry of finance, there however is no mistaking
Mr. Bennie's message - he thinks that there is a whole lot going wrong,
and he wants the Liberian people to know about it. But I am not sure
I know exactly what he is alleging.
Some of what Mr. Josephus Moses Gray reports in his July 3, 2004, article
titled "Charles Bennie Releases Evidence of Corrupt Practices"
sheds some light on the issue but falls far short of framing any urgency
that would make it the subject of a press conference: "According to
the documentary evidence, the government, for the month of November 2003,
generated US$5,146,362.01; December 2003, US$7,985,521.76; January 2004,
US$7,547,757.84; February 2004, US$7,076,968.68; March 2004, US$6,687,907;
April 2004, US$8,155,118.63 and in May 2004, US$5,681,508.71."
But the fact that this government collected money is not newsworthy.
Collecting money and spending money are activities clearly predicted by
the need for submitting a budget at the beginning of a fiscal year.
A budget, therefore, is a forecast of the size and scope of the collecting
and spending activities. These activities, however, are not
theft-proof. In fact, they are susceptible to larceny - a fact that
is well known by most Liberians and may very well have been the source of
some of the hysteria attending the Bennie allegations.
For instance, according to the Inquirer newspaper, "Commissioner
Bennie … remains deterred[sic] in his accusation against Chairman Bryant
… that the monthly revenue generation has been misapplied by the
government to the detriment of the vast war weary and suffering people of
Liberia while few guys enrich themselves." But, again, I can't
see where Mr. Bennie has expended any efforts in providing proof of how
(or whether) the "few guys" got their hands on the public funds.
There is no doubt that Mr. Bennie's charges are substantial in bulk and
potential gravity, but they are not yet substantiated for their immoral or
criminal claims. Yet even without Mr. Bennie's proof, Chairman
Bryant finds himself in an increasingly untenable position. The
charges are impressive enough in appearance that anyone or groups of
people approaching their limits of tolerance of past corruption may do or
say something that may set us back on this tortuous road to recovery from
a crippling war. It would be tragic if the mass of Mr. Bennie's
charges would trigger explosion ahead of any substantiation.
But quite apart from the allegation of possible embezzlement of any funds,
there is the question of the channel for reporting suspicious activities,
especially when they occur and are observed by a person in the same branch
of the government where the observer works. This is where the
meeting suggested by Chairman Bryant between Mr. Bennie and a special
committee headed by Vice Chairman Wesley Johnson might have been useful;
although I would not have put a 48-hour limit on the discovery of the
truth as Chairman Bryant has done in apparent anger.
In response, Bennie contends that the "executive mansion is not a
courthouse where people go to produce their evidence." But
Bennie is only half right on this score. The "Executive Mansion
is not a courthouse," but it currently stands in need of evidence
because it is being accused of wrongdoing. Sure enough, the court
would have extracted evidence from Bennie without catering to his whims,
but I believe that the matter is still in the realm of normal
administrative investigation in the executive branch where both Chairman
Bryant and Commissioner Bennie work. And notwithstanding the
eclectic make-up of the current government, there is still a
superior-subordinate relationship between any two persons working in the
same branch of the government.
Too bad Mr. Bennie has already filed his complaint with the International
Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), because any suggestion of mismanagement
will further delay the redemption of the pledges made by some
international donors to pull Liberia from the brink of disaster.
Copyrighted © Tarty Teh 2004
Washington, DC, July 10, 2004
Targeting
Monrovia
By Tarty Teh
July 28, 2003
It will take nothing short of the rarest form of
criminal insanity for those of us in LURD to allow, let alone authorize,
the shelling of a diplomatic enclave just to make sure that we have the
most improved chances of hitting the facility of the Superpower or any
combination of its allies. Yes, we were angry enough about the delay game
President Charles Taylor continues to play.
Our resulting actions from that anger have put us close
enough to Monrovia to make us a credible suspect in the irrational
bombardment of humanitarianly sensitive targets in and around Monrovia.
But let's get realistic and take a closer look at whom and what we are
dealing with in Liberia.
For Taylor, triggering the wrath of the United States
against the -- until now -- Cinderella LURD will be a worthwhile parting
shot, now that he is without any options. So, even if it can be determined
that Taylor authorized his forces to shell the diplomatic commune from
central Monrovia, how much worse can things get for him than they are now?
That's the question.
I have been involved with the Accra peace talks for
nearly a month and a half now. And those Liberians who are aware of my
involvement in the process may be asking themselves how it is possible for
me to be a part of something so obviously evil and destructive and not say
something one way or another. But credible responses to any accusations
must not be automatic if they are to be plausible. Even so, plausibility
is a form of excuse.
I have been trying to find out if, in fact, we have
shelled Mamba Point at any time and for any reason. The information I have
received from the frontline is that we have not. Those in the know on
these matters have told me that even if we had the will to shell Mamba
Point, the U.S. embassy would not be easy to target. Besides range, there
is the question of line of sight from LURD's acknowledged position in the
Freeport of Monrovia. This is based on the premise that we, in fact, have
the caliber of weapons for launching the ordnances that have landed in
Mamba Point so far.
The Taylor government is fully aware of the types of
weapons LURD has used against its forces. They therefore have the list of
ingredients they can use to create a scenario for implicating LURD in any
atrocious design. They know, for instance, the calibers of LURD's biggest
weapons. They therefore waited for LURD to get close enough to Monrovia so
that anything that dropped on Monrovia could credibly be blamed more on
LURD than on the Taylor forces.
The truth is strained even further if you factor in the
claim, according to our commanders, that though LURD has infantry mortars
launchers for 81mm shells as the largest caliber weapons among its forces
around Monrovia, targeting the U.S. embassy remains a tricky business due
more to physical obstructions than to range.
According to one of our military men, a mortar shell
looking for the U.S. embassy has to make lateral course correction while
in flight or it will a) fly by the embassy or b) nearly go into orbit in
order to drop straight down on the embassy. But if the launch is from the
Freeport area, range is severely sacrificed even for an 81mm mortar, if
the idea is to hit the U.S. embassy. Again, what would be the reason for
trying this hard to hit the U.S. embassy from a distance from which
accuracy is in serious jeopardy?
As if this were not odd enough, the list of targets that
LURD supposedly struck does not fit its liberation profile. Consider the
following places that found themselves on LURD's supposed target list as
proved by the fact that they were actually hit. What these places have in
common is their use as temporary refuges for displaced persons in and
around Monrovia: 1) Newport Street Junior High; 2) Gray Stone Compound; 3)
Greater Refuge Temple; 4) Masonic Temple; 5) Holiday Inn hotel and, of
course, 6) the U.S. embassy compound.
Our fighters have never been formally schooled in the
art of deception. At least we were not trained in Libya. So, if we are
qualified for any level of common sense, then it makes no sense to try to
do everything right while we were hundreds of miles away from Monrovia,
only to switch to the criminally stupid mode once there are international
media cameras available to record our actions.
Yet among those who are quick to blame LURD for the
bombs that are landing in Mamba Point are those who claim that the United
States confirmed their allegations that LURD is the one sending the bombs.
Well, there is a limit even to U.S. intelligence, especially while the
U.S. has not landed a single soldier on Liberian soil away from its own
embassy in Monrovia. But this does not mean that United States is not free
to guess who's sending the bombs. However, if the U.S. guesses wrongly,
there may be another bomb or two heading for the wrong address.
--
end --
Office
of Chief Political Representative for
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
Press Release
June 8, 2003
The 72-Hour
Window of Opportunity for Charles Taylor
We are quite aware of the risks associated with running an operation that
is based on moral principles and the expectation to do the right thing all
the time. That's the situation in which we in Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) find ourselves. If we are as moral as
we claim, then it is reasonable to expect us to abide by any reasonable
demand made of us.
Conversely, people without moral principles are unencumbered by any need
for response in kind, even if the request comes from a charter
organization, such as the United Nations, which is in the business of
ending crises. President Charles Taylor and his government are in this
latter category.
The United Nations and all of the African continental and regional
organizations committed their meager resources since 1989 in trying to
contain Mr. Taylor. Against their wishes and efforts, Taylor grew to
become not only an overwhelming problem for the people of Liberia, but to
acquire the status of being the biggest menace for West Africa.
But LURD has now forced Taylor into a position in which his options are
growing fewer by the day. That could have had the opposite effect on LURD
as being over-confident in achieving a military victory. But instead we
are looking at the potential toll in human lives and are asking whether
defeating Taylor militarily is worth the cost.
However, we knew that Taylor would count on us to ponder that question.
That is why he retreated to Monrovia to make his last stand by using the
population of that city as a shield, and hoping that the international
community will prevail on us once again to make another concession that
will let Taylor elude the grasp of justice. But we know that Taylor has a
history of putting any respite into good use to further his devious
design.
We therefore had to put a timetable on our agreement to cease fire. We
proposed 72 hours since Saturday, June 7, 2003. We are not sure what use
Taylor will put to the lull, but we hope he will use that time wisely for
once. But no matter how Taylor chooses to use the 72 hours, he should not
expect us to extend that deadline regardless of any situation in which it
finds him.
One thing that will truncate the truce is any action by the Taylor forces
that violates the current 72-hours cease-fire. In that case our response
will be full resumption of our attempt to capture Taylor to end the
nightmare of the Liberian people. We will not continue to sacrifice the
lives of our fighters in other to continue to give Charles Taylor the
benefit of the doubt.
Signed:
Tarty Teh
Chief Political Representative for
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
Approved:
Dr. Moses C.T. Jarbo
General Coordinator for
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
cc: National Executive Committee (NEC)
While
Liberia Bleeds
By
Tarty Teh
June 4, 2003
Of all the countries in Africa, Liberia has the second longest history of
nationhood. Therefore, any data extracted from Liberia's social and
political history can soundly support any prediction of the behavior of
the country's social and political elite. But the behavior in
question is not such a strange phenomenon. Anyone with any
measurable amount of knowledge of the sad foundation upon which Liberia
was founded will understand the fervor with which some elements of the
Liberian society stake their claims to political power.
Sadly and conversely, there is an underlining assumption that failure is
guaranteed whenever people who are not steeped in the culture of Liberia's
self-appointed political and social elite undertake any endeavor of
national scope. Unless, of course, the central role in such
enterprise is reserved for those who regard themselves as born to lead
Liberia. That postulate, however, has not been fully tested.
Regarding the current drive to end the war in Liberia, I am not sure what
Liberia's brand-name politicians are saying to the West African patrons
for peace regarding what or whom it will take to restore order to Liberia.
But placing a bet now will condemn the premise of my own argument.
However, I can sense certain things easily not because I studied Liberia,
but because I was born a Liberian. In fact, it would not have been
enough to be born a Liberian, if I were not a member of Liberia's cultural
majority. This membership, by the way, was not by subscription.
One is born into a circumstance and from that point tries to make the most
of it. This, of course, was not meant as an apology but as a counter
point to any argument that being born a tribal person in Liberia is an
affliction from which one must seek to recover.
From this point on, I will assume that Liberians of all stripes are equal
and should therefore aspire equally to any heights. With that in
mind, I must add that the current conflict in Liberia was begun on a
premise that concedes supremacy to a small group of Liberians from whom we
chose our leaders for more than a century and a quarter. That being
the case, any suggestion that seeks a conscious balance of the elements
that constitute Liberia's political leadership should not therefore be
regarded as driven by prejudice.
Because being of tribal extraction in Liberia was never thought of as a
suitable platform for acquiring social and political refinement, Liberian
tribal virtues were never seriously considered in the creation and
maintenance of political institutions. Even while we tribal
Liberians were being encouraged to unlearn our otherwise natural
tribal-ness, Liberia's social and political institutions were in the hands
of those whose had no means or saw no reasons for relating to Africa.
Therefore, for instance, to pursue a career in broadcasting in Liberia,
one would have had to profess ignorance of any tribal language in Liberia.
However, such ignorance that was once cute has now become an acute
obstacle to understanding Africa. How will one know why Africa cries
if one does not understand any of her languages? It is therefore
easy to destroy Africa if one cannot or does not wish to relate to Africa.
This explains the death of 220,000 people in Liberia when those who hired
Charles Taylor in 1989 decided that ten years was all they would allow
themselves to be out of power in Liberia. Being on top of the
majority of the African population in Liberia was all they knew, so they
would not settle for anything less.
But Charles Taylor also killed Nigerians, Sierra Leoneans, Guineans,
Senegalese, and Ghanaians. He killed only a half dozen American
nuns. While he was on this killing spree, we acceded to his wishes
through peace agreements - 13 of them - that we negotiated with him.
He signed but accepted each accord long enough for him to regroup his
forces and position himself to make another demand of the terrified
Liberian population and the equally dumbfounded West African armies that
had gone to keep peace in Liberia.
That was six years ago. Death is now a slow leak in Liberia, but we
have determined its cause. It is Charles MacArthur Taylor. We
have decided that we will risk a new beginning rather than live with
death, however slowly it comes to us by Taylor's executive fiat.
That much is obvious, but the real danger lurks just below the surface.
In 1990 Liberia lay bleeding - freshly wounded - while the cabal that had
planned an executed the attack on her met in Banjul, the Gambia.
They selected one of their own members to become interim President of
Liberia while Charles Taylor, the man they had hired out of prison to
destroy Liberia, was still on the rampage. Their conference site was
out of reach of many Liberians, even if they were aware of what was being
crafted there.
The cabal has convened again. They are talking, as before, about: interim
presidency, powering sharing, and an intervention force for Liberia.
These are the same ingredients that ignited the flame that is still
consuming West Africa: an interim government, a joint presidency with
Taylor, and a supposedly more tamed version of ECOMOG, euphemistically
called "an intervention force." But those who are pushing
what they believe is a new scheme are deadly serious. They are
already in Ghana to deliver their plans to the International Contact
Group. They only need to sell the plans to that ad hoc group, not to
the Liberian people, and they will have us by the balls again. We
must therefore be even more determined to foil their plans this time
around.
So, the conference in Ghana should be about removing Charles Taylor, not
how much longer he should remain in power. Even more so, it is not
about supplanting him with seedlings from the nursery from which Liberia
grew its leaders for the past 150 years. The one thing we have not
tried in Liberia is something made of Africa. The people who started
the military movements that have forced Charles Taylor to the negotiating
table - notably Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) -
must have had (should have had) something in mind. We need to know
what it is. Most of all, we must try it because, at this point,
nothing can be worse than Charles Taylor as president of Liberia or
whatever else his handlers have concocted lately. <>
Copyrighted © Tarty Teh 2003
Washington, D.C., June 4, 2003
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